“ ”

The everything bubble……In the decade after Lehman's bankruptcy a great variety of assets soared to extreme valuations. There were bubbles in industrial commodities and rare-earth elements, in US agricultural land and Chinese garlic bulbs, in fine or not-so-fine art (depending on your taste), bubbles in vintage cars and fancy handbags, bubbles in 'super-city' apartments, bubbles in sovereign bonds, bubbles in Silicon Valley unicorns and cryptocurrencies, and a giant bubble in American stocks. Never before in history had so many asset price bubbles inflated simultaneously. But then, never before in history had interest rates around the world sunk so low.

- Edward Chancellor, *The Price of Time, The Real Story of Interest (2022)*

To Our Clients and Friends:

From all appearances, the “everything rally” that elevated risk asset valuations over the last decade came to an abrupt end early last year as the architects of this asset boom, central bankers around the world, were forced to reverse course to fight a pernicious inflation that has proven to be anything but temporary. Since March of 2022, Fed policy has gone from maintaining interest rates at near the zero-bound to increasing the Fed funds rate in a series of eight hikes from roughly 0.25% as of last March 17th to 4.75% as of February 2nd of this year The Fed also stopped expanding its balance sheet (quantitative easing) in March of last year. One market commentator analogized the Fed's behavior as switching from being an arsonist to a firefighter virtually overnight. As of February 28, 2023, the three-month US treasury bill, and the two- and ten-year US Treasury Notes traded with yields of 4.7%, 4.8%, and 3.9%, respectively. The spike in interest rates and the end of quantitative easing has sparked a downward spiral in risk asset valuations, particularly those of longer durations such as growth and technology stocks. Many macroeconomic gurus and market observers alike have found it hard to be "constructive," to borrow an overused word, about the near term prospects for global equities. Uncertain as to where to place their bets in the near term, investor sentiment remains somewhat weighed down by the ongoing economic quagmire we find ourselves in around the globe. While there has been some progress of late, inflation has remained stubbornly persistent in the face of increasingly tightening financial conditions, and the prospects for a global recession continue to weigh on investor confidence. On top of all this, supply chain issues, while improving somewhat around year end, continue to disrupt global trade, leading to shortages, higher input costs, declining profit margins and the prospect for lower corporate earnings. With borrowing costs on the rise, threatening the robust corporate earnings power which has in part supported high risk-asset valuations, global equity markets have lost their footing and remain highly volatile and on edge.

Despite a rather impressive summer rally last year that saw US and international equity indices recover much of their declines from earlier in the year, markets became turbulent once again in the late summer and early fall, as August inflation data offered little prospect of a long hoped for "Fed pivot." By September quarter end, the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ, and the MSCI EAFE Index had all broken through their prior market lows and were trading well into bear market territory. In October, global equities began a rebound that lasted for much of the 4th quarter as inflation ticked down a bit, renewing hopes for a Fed pivot and the possibility of a soft landing for the global

A list containing all recommendations made by Tweedy, Browne Company LLC within the previous 12 months is available upon request. It should not be assumed that all recommendations made in the past have been profitable or that recommendations made in the future will be profitable or will equal the performance of the securities in this list.

economy. Nevertheless, 2022 was an incredibly challenging year for global equity markets, which continue to be buffeted by a host of macroeconomic concerns.

Nowhere did market sentiment suffer more over much of the last year than in non-US equity markets, particularly those of Europe and the emerging markets, which were held back in part by tightening financial conditions, collapsing currencies, skyrocketing energy costs, continuing supply chain disruption, and the war in Ukraine. In addition, up until year-end, aggressive COVID lockdowns in China helped to constrain economic growth there and in other parts of Asia, wreaking havoc with global supply chains. Faster and steeper rises in US interest rates helped to turbo charge for much of the last year the value of the US dollar relative to most foreign currencies, and the Japanese yen, the British pound, and the euro were all trading at multi-decade lows last Fall, further compromising returns on unhedged positions for US-based investors. The strong US dollar also contributed to inflation in the emerging markets, which are dependent on critical commodities such as food and energy that are generally priced in US dollars. Furthermore, many emerging markets borrowed aggressively, often in US dollars, at the prevailing low rates of the last decade, and now face high refinancing and carrying costs, which they can ill afford.

This cauldron of economic uncertainty around the world stoked fear amongst investors, causing many to begin to deallocate from non-US equities in the late summer and early fall of last year. According to data from Refinitiv Lipper reported in the September 6th edition of The Wall Street Journal, investors had been piling into US stocks and US equity-focused mutual funds for four of the previous six weeks (prior to Sept. 6th), while yanking money from international stock funds for 20 consecutive weeks. The Journal went on to report that this was the longest streak of withdrawals since a 22-week run of outflows that ended in October of 2019. We believe these withdrawing investors were likely making a mistake. In contrast to their US counterparts, we believe many non-US equities, particularly those of the value variety, were being priced as if Armageddon was at the door, and we all know Armageddon rarely shows up. Jason Zweig acknowledged this dichotomy, and the potential opportunity it afforded investors, in his popular Wall Street Journal column, The Intelligent Investor:

> *Enterprising investors—those who are willing to put time and effort into diverging from the crowd--should always be thinking about where potential for surprise is the greatest. For US investors right now, that could mean venturing abroad.*

-*Where You Can Find Stock-Market Bargains*, The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2022

Further addressing this opportunity in international stocks and, in his view, the currencies in which they are denominated, he went on to opine:

> *Now international currencies, and stocks, are simultaneously depressed relative to the US If the dollar ultimately declines from its recent record highs, that drop would give a double boost to the returns on overseas stocks. I can't tell you when that will happen, but I think it probably will. The obvious negatives are already priced in: a prolonged war in Ukraine, an acute energy crisis and raging inflation, a brutal recession, floundering currencies. With pessimism this pervasive, it wouldn't take many positive surprises to overturn the obvious—and make global diversification lucrative again.*

The pessimism around the near term prospects for non-US equities, in part, caused a rather large valuation gap to develop last year between US and non-US equities, evidenced by the large dispersion in valuation between US-based market indexes and the value components of a number of non-US indexes. Some would argue that this is largely attributable to the fact that highly valued large cap technology stocks dominate US indexes, while they play a more marginal role in non-US indexes. While we acknowledge this difference in mix, we believe that it does not completely explain the extreme differential in index

valuations, or for that matter, between individual non-US companies and their US counterparts in a variety of different industry groups.

US AND INTERNATIONAL VALUE MEASURES

INDEX	DIVIDEND YIELD	P/E	P/E FWD	P/BV
S&P 500 Index	1.77	19.17	17.57	3.66
S&P 500 Value Index	2.10	17.04	15.55	2.58
S&P 500 Growth Index	1.48	22.10	20.75	6.56
MSCI EAFE Value Index	4.62	9.85	8.92	1.05
MSCI ACWI ex USA Value Index	4.79	9.54	8.80	1.07
MSCI Europe Value Index	4.65	9.30	8.49	1.13
MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Value Index	4.27	9.64	8.83	0.96
MSCI Emerging Markets Value Index	5.19	8.71	8.26	1.04

The above chart displays valuation metrics (dividend yield, price/earnings and price/book value ratios) for various indexes provided by S&P Global and MSCI. The consensus earnings estimates are taken from financial analysts as provided by Thomson I/B/E/S for all countries except Japan. For Japan, data from Toyo Keizai is used for securities that are not covered by Thomson I/B/E/S.
Source: S&P Global and MSCI Fact Sheets as of December 31, 2022

One should not lose sight of the fact that there are many wonderful companies with durable competitive advantages domiciled abroad, and many of those are often amongst the top performing stocks globally each year. From a pricing perspective, the opportunity set that was presented to us over the last year, particularly in international equities, was in our view quite attractive. This dichotomy in valuations between US and non-US equities would appear to have also caught the attention of investors of late, as non-US equities have begun to come back to life over the last several months. From September 30, 2022 through January 31, 2023, the MSCI EAFE Index returned 26.84% in US dollars, versus 14.32% for the S&P 500. The value component of the MSCI EAFE Index was up 28.88%, versus 21.54% for the S&P 500 Value Index. A weakening US dollar, improving inflation data, weather-related declines in energy prices, and a relaxation of COVID restrictions in China are no doubt playing a role with respect to this near term change in investor sentiment.

We've provided some comparisons below of non-US equities held in one or more of our managed account portfolios that we believe were trading at large discounts to similar US companies around year end. These are the kinds of discounts that, when coupled with a discount from our estimate of intrinsic value, get us "trembling with greed."

Johnson Service Group (UK-based industrial laundry business)

Both UK-based Johnson Service Group ("Johnson") and US-based UniFirst Corporation (UniFirst) are industrial laundry businesses. Both companies have similar business models characterized by the following: providing an essential service at a low cost to thousands of customers in a variety of industries, high recurring revenue, and multi-year customer contracts. The primary difference between the two businesses (apart from location) is customer mix. While UniFirst provides laundry services primarily for employee uniforms, Johnson provides laundry services for employee uniforms and for hotel, restaurant and catering linens.

As of December 31, Johnson was trading in the UK market at 1.3x enterprise value ("EV") to trailing twelve-month ("TTM") revenue, 13x its EV to TTM earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization ("EBITA"), and at approximately 15x TTM price to earnings ("P/E"). In contrast, US-based UniFirst was trading in the US equity market as of the same date at 1.6x EV to TTM revenue, 18x its EV to TTM EBITA, and at approximately 26x TTM P/E.

	EV/TTM revenue	EV/TTM EBITA	TTM P/E
Johnson Services Group	1.1x	13x	15x
UniFirst	1.4x	18x	26x

While it is clear that Johnson is quantitatively cheaper than its closest US-listed peer on current earnings, we also believe the business is under-earning. Pre-COVID, Johnson derived 60% of EBITA from hotels, restaurants and catering customers. COVID had a material negative impact on these end markets in 2020 and 2021 in large part due to UK government imposed lockdowns. While an earnings recovery has been underway in 2022, profitability from these customers remains well below pre-COVID levels. Recent market consensus of a UK recession on the horizon may further delay the expected earnings recovery.

Even on depressed earnings, Johnson Services Group trades well below our estimate of intrinsic value. M&A (merger and acquisition) comparables of similar businesses in Europe have occurred at an average of 2.3x EV to revenue and 15x EV to EBITA. Recent corporate actions, in our view, may reflect positive signaling by the company about its future prospects. Following a September 1, 2022 earnings release, Johnson reinstated the payment of dividends and announced a corporate share repurchase program (first of its kind), and the CEO bought 30,000 shares in the open market.

CNH (UK-based agricultural equipment business)

CNH and Deere & Company (the company behind the John Deere brand, which is not currently held in our managed account portfolios) are the two largest players in the oligopolistic agricultural equipment industry. The two companies have very similar product offerings with farmers often referring to them simply by the color of their equipment: green for John Deere and red for CNH. Both companies compete globally, although John Deere has a much higher market share in the profitable North American market. John Deere also has a stronger position in precision Ag equipment. As such, in our view, Deere deserves somewhat of a valuation premium to CNH. However, as of December 31, Deere was selling for 18.4x its 2022 Bloomberg consensus estimated earnings versus CNH's 11.2x figure.

	P/E (est)
CNH	11.2x
Deere & Co.	18.4x

CNH has long been listed and headquartered in Europe, since it is controlled by Italy's Agnelli family, and its valuation often reflects that of more commoditized European industrial companies rather than that of a strong player in the oligopolistic agricultural equipment industry. In our view, CNH appears to be getting punished largely due to its European domicile and the pall that currently hangs over European markets. We believe this is a behavioral error that can be exploited. CNH is currently dual listed (on the New York Stock Exchange and the Borsa Italiana in Milan, Italy), but analysts and investors have been encouraging CNH to move exclusively to a US listing to address the valuation discount. They have acknowledged that concern and have stated their intent to move to a single listing in the United States.

Deutsche Post (German-based logistics business)

Deutsche Post is a German-listed logistics conglomerate with strong businesses in Express delivery, Freight Forwarding and Supply Chain management, all of which compete globally under the DHL brand. These businesses are leaders in their industries, and collectively comprise ~80% of Deutsche Post's operating income. Deutsche Post was selling for just 8.3x Bloomberg consensus estimates of its 2022 earnings (as of December 31), while comparable US companies in Deutsche Posts' various business lines were selling for double digit forward earnings multiples such as UPS (express delivery) at 13.4x, Expeditors (freight forwarding) at 11.8x, and GXO Logistics (supply chain management) at 15.6x.

	P/E (est)
Deutsche Post	8.3x
UPS	13.4x
Expeditors	11.8x
GXO Logistics	15.6x

In our view, as a result of the network effect and the scale advantages inherent in its various businesses, Deutsche Post is a very strong business. It has consistently earned a 20%+ return on equity (ROE) including goodwill and, if analyst's estimates are accurate, may have the potential to grow its revenue at a mid-single digit rate as a result of secular trends in e-commerce, outsourcing and de-globalization. The company's largest business, Express, is the global leader in the express delivery industry with a 38% market share. It competes in an oligopoly with FedEx and UPS. Deutsche Post's current management has also changed the capital allocation culture at the company, as it now focuses more on returns on capital and free cash flow generation than in the past. As of December 31, the company had a 4.8% dividend yield and a €2 billion share repurchase program, which represented approximately 4.3% of the company's December 31, 2022 market value. On June 28, 2022, the company announced, "Given the current opportunistic market environment, the Group decided to further front-load the execution of its share buybacks, making use of its financial strength." Four company insiders purchased over €1.08 million in Deutsche Post shares in May and June of 2022, including two directors and the current CEO. The CEO will be retiring this year.

Alibaba (Chinese-based internet platform business)

Chinese-based Alibaba and US-based Amazon are the two largest e-commerce players in their respective home markets. Both companies have leading cloud computing businesses in addition to various other businesses or investments that are either unprofitable or do not contribute materially to earnings. While there are good reasons why Alibaba trades at a discounted valuation relative to Amazon, we believe the gap in valuation is irrationally large, and in our view unwarranted. On a stated earnings basis, Amazon was selling for approximately 64.7x 2022 Bloomberg consensus estimated earnings for the fiscal year ending December 2022, while Alibaba was selling for just 11.5x its Bloomberg consensus estimated earnings for the fiscal year ending in March 2023.

	P/E (est)
Alibaba	11.5x
Amazon	64.7x

We believe each company's core e-commerce business could grow significantly over time due to increasing e-commerce penetration, while both of their cloud computing businesses could enjoy strong secular growth for years to come.

It is important to note that Amazon and Alibaba are not the same exact type of e-commerce business. Alibaba is a pure marketplace business, and therefore, it is very "asset light." On the other hand, Amazon is both a marketplace and a direct retailer. Amazon also owns its logistics and warehousing, which makes it very asset intensive. Amazon also in a way competes against its merchants, where Alibaba exists solely to support and enable them. Alibaba's customer is the merchant, while Amazon primarily serves the end customer. All in all, Amazon might have a better competitive position than Alibaba, but it is a more asset intensive business, and we believe China should grow faster than the US over time. Finally, Alibaba has nearly 43% of its market cap in net cash and equity investments as of December 30 2022, implying very little value for all of its operating businesses. Despite recent corporate governance challenges in China that continue to pose investment risks, we believe that the shares are appropriate for a modest position in many of our clients' portfolios in light of what we feel is an extreme undervaluation.

We certainly understand that investors have perhaps grown weary of the poor relative returns of non-US equities over the last ten plus years, but it's important to understand that this has not always been the case. For example, international equities significantly outperformed their US counterparts for the ten years following the bursting of the dot com bubble back in March of 2000. In fact, as we have mentioned in past letters, since the mid-1970s through December 31, 2022, rolling 10-year returns for the S&P 500 (calculated monthly) outperformed rolling 10 year returns for the MSCI EAFE Index in only 55% of the periods measured. That means the MSCI EAFE Index outperformed the S&P 500 in roughly 45% of those rolling ten year periods. Over the last 10 years, the S&P 500 produced returns that were more than double those produced by the MSCI EAFE Index. While we cannot know for sure, we suspect the next 10 years are likely to bear little resemblance to the last 10 years.

As Ben Graham advised, "always buy your straw hats in winter." Investors would be keen to keep this in mind in thinking about their asset allocation, as the next decade from an investment perspective could prove to be entirely different from the last.

PERFORMANCE

The year ending December 31 proved to be extraordinarily challenging for market indexes, with most of our accounts' benchmarks finishing the period with double digit declines. More often than not, when equity markets have been in decline, value-oriented investments have generally tended to hold up a bit better than broader market indexes. In this respect, our managed accounts, on the whole, did not disappoint.

Most of our managed account composites, with the exception of the International Equity Composite (Currency Exposure Hedged to the USD) ("International Hedged Composite"), bested their respective benchmark indexes during the reporting period. While the International Hedged Composite underperformed its hedged benchmark during the period, it outperformed the more broadly recognized unhedged MSCI EAFE Index by 698 basis points net of fees. The Composite's underperformance relative to the hedged benchmark was largely related to our policy of hedging only perceived foreign currency

	ANNUALIZED RETURNS FOR PERIODS ENDING 12/31/2022		
	1 YEAR	5 YEARS	10 YEARS
US Equity/ADR Composite	-9.83%	2.71%	5.92%
International Hedged Composite	-7.47%	2.49%	5.16%
International Equity Composite (in USD)	-8.57%	0.99%	3.33%
Global Hedged Composite	-7.00%	2.45%	5.45%
Global Equity Composite (in USD)	-8.17	2.13%	4.57%
Global High Dividend Yield Equity Composite	-10.04%	1.32%	3.91%

Please see important disclosures regarding the Composites and their complete investment records starting on page 15.

exposure (whereas the benchmark is 100% nominally hedged). That said, hedging perceived foreign currency risk continued to provide significant protection for our hedged accounts against return dilution from declining foreign currencies, and that was critically important during a period when the pound, the euro and the yen were in free fall. In the fall of 2022, all three of these major currencies were trading at multi-decade lows against the US dollar. Our Global Equity Composite (Currency Exposure Hedged to the USD) ("Global Hedged Composite"), which bested both the hedged and unhedged MSCI World Index by 838 and 1,114 basis points, respectively, net of fees, during the period, also benefitted from its constituents' policy of hedging perceived foreign currency exposure. Both our International Equity Composite (in USD) and Global High Dividend Yield Equity Composite, which do not hedge foreign currency risk, also bested their benchmarks by 588 and 810 basis points, respectively, net of fees.

(Keep in mind that the hedged client accounts are not fully nominally hedged, like the hedged index is, and that the accounts look very different from the index in terms of portfolio composition, country, sector, industry and market capitalization allocation, and other metrics.)

With interest rates aggressively on the rise and increasing concerns about a slowdown in growth, if not a contraction in corporate earnings, the rotation of investors away from longer duration, more growth-oriented equities to shorter duration, more value-oriented equities that began in September 2020 remained firmly in place for much of last year.

As we write in early February, equity markets have recovered somewhat from their 2022 year-end lows. While it is impossible, of course, to know whether markets will revisit those lows, if the past is prologue concerning previous major market inflection points, the turbulence of the last year may go on for a while. The good news is that these volatile markets, in our view, continue to churn up new investment opportunities. We remain hopeful that this challenging environment, and the potential pricing opportunities it presents, could set the stage for the continuing resurgence of value investing.

THE CONFLAGRATION IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES

Not too many letters ago, we spoke of a "bonfire" in foreign currencies that was seriously compromising international investment returns when translated back into US dollars. For much of last year that bonfire became a "conflagration" with many major currencies such as the British pound, the euro, and the Japanese yen declining to multi-decade lows relative to the US dollar.

5-YEAR DECLINE IN CURRENCIES RELATIVE TO THE US DOLLAR

Source: Refinitiv Datastream
The chart above illustrates the cumulative decline in currency rates relative to the US dollar from December 31, 2017 through December 31, 2022 based on daily currency rate data provided by Refinitiv Datastream. The three currencies (euro, British pound, and Japanese yen) were normalized using a base of 100 on December 31, 2017 and the chart reflects the cumulative percentage change for each of the three currencies over the subsequent five years.

With currency volatility on the rise last year, we were reassured by our decision roughly 30 years ago to offer our managed account clients the option of hedging their portfolios' perceived foreign currency exposure back into the US dollar, thus mitigating to a significant degree the dilution to total returns posed by declining foreign currencies. As you know, possible losses from changes in foreign currency exchange rates are a risk of investing unhedged in foreign stocks. While a stock may perform well on the London stock exchange, if the British pound declines against the US dollar, a gain on that stock can disappear or even become a loss when translated back into US dollars. Last year, declining foreign currencies compounded losses in many international equities, adding insult to injury. Back in 1992, offering our clients the option to hedge their currency exposure was based in part on the empirically based notion that over long measurement periods, exposure to foreign currency did not make investors much, if any, additional money, and yet added to the volatility of their return streams.

Volatility in a return stream can impact an investor's decision to "stay on the bus," which we have always viewed as critical for long term investment success. We believe that the practice of hedging perceived foreign currency exposure, where practicable, helps mitigate the volatility of investing internationally. Over the years, the decision to hedge, in our view, has proven to be a sound one.

As you know, the practice of hedging perceived foreign currency exposure tends to make hedged portfolios outperform a similar unhedged portfolio in a strong US dollar environment [i.e., when the dollar is gaining in value against the local currencies in which the portfolio's investments are denominated]. Conversely, hedging perceived foreign currency exposure tends to make a hedged portfolio underperform a similar unhedged portfolio in a weak US dollar environment [i.e., when the dollar is losing value against the local currencies in which the portfolio's investments are denominated].

At the end of the day, we leave the decision of whether to be hedged or unhedged to our clients. What we would caution against, however, are attempts to try to time the currency markets by moving money between hedged and unhedged strategies. Our continued advice to investors is to simply adopt a hedged or unhedged posture and stick with it over the long term. We continue to believe either path is likely to lead to a similar return destination, but with potentially different levels of intra-period volatility.

PORTFOLIO ATTRIBUTION

Please note that the individual companies discussed herein represent holdings in some of our managed accounts, but are not necessarily held in all of our managed accounts.

As previously mentioned herein, rising inflation and interest rates, increasing prospects for a consequential global recession, spiking energy prices, collapsing foreign currencies and the ongoing war in Ukraine continued to wreak havoc with global equity markets, and in turn, our managed account portfolios last year. Most sectors, industry groups (with the exception of energy), countries and individual securities faced declines during the period. While there were a few bright spots, they were few and far between.

While the majority of companies in our client portfolios continued to make financial progress with underlying corporate earnings holding up fairly well, profit margins at many of them began to come under some pressure due to rising input costs. Some of the decline in many, if not most, of their stock prices was no doubt also tied to multiple contraction in the face of rising interest/discount rates as opposed to just deteriorating fundamentals.

On the whole, oil & gas, biotech, specialty retail, aerospace & defense, and our insurance holdings were significant positive contributors to our portfolios' returns during the period. This included strong results from companies such as TotalEnergies, Ionis, Vertex Phamaceuticals, AutoZone, BAE Systems, Rheinmetall, and Zurich Insurance. In contrast, communication services, materials, and consumer staples stocks took it on the chin, with the hardest hit taken by a number of the portfolios' air freight & logistics, commercial services, interactive media, chemicals, and food product companies. This included disappointing stock returns from FedEx, Deutsche Post, A-Living-Smart City Services, Alphabet (Google), BASF, Intel, and Nestle, among others.

Our composites at year end were generally diversified by issue, country (except the US Equity/ADR Composite), sector, industry group, and market capitalization, but continued to bear very little resemblance to broad market indexes (Diversification does not guarantee a profit and does not protect against a loss in a declining market.) While many portfolios still have a larger capitalization orientation, there have been numerous smaller and medium capitalization companies added to many of our portfolios over the last couple of years. Exposure to some of the more developed of the emerging markets has also increased at the margin in many portfolios as well. This includes investments in Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, China, Mexico, and Chile, among others. Given the robust opportunity set available in this volatile environment, most of our clients' portfolios remain relatively fully invested.

PORTFOLIO ACTIVITY

With market volatility persisting for most of the last year, we remained very active, establishing a significant number of new positions in most managed account portfolios. We also added to a number of positions during the period.

New additions to many of our clients' portfolios included Deutsche Post, the German-based logistics company, which through its subsidiary, DHL, is the leader internationally in parcel dispatch and express delivery services; UK-based Howden Joinery, which designs, manufactures, and sells fitted kitchens; KBC Group, the Belgian-based bank, which enjoys a strong banking franchise in Belgium and in central and

eastern Europe; Nabtesco, the small to medium sized Japanese industrial company that manufactures precision parts for a wide range of motion-control applications including robots, aircrafts, railway equipment, and construction equipment; and Husqvarna, a Swedish-based company, which is a leading manufacturer and distributor of outdoor power tools including robotic lawnmowers. In our view, all of these newly added positions were trading at significant discounts from our conservative estimates of their underlying intrinsic values at purchase, had solid balance sheets that should allow them to weather economic storms, appear to be positioned to benefit from future runways of potential growth, and in many, if not most instances, were being purchased by knowledgeable insiders at or around the prices we were paying for the shares.

On the sell side, among others, we sold the bulk of our clients' remaining shares of BASF, the German-based chemical company; CNP Assurances, the French-based insurance company; 3M, the US-based manufacturer of consumer brands; and Bollore, the French-based holding company with interests in transportation, logistics, and media. The stock prices of these businesses had either reached our estimates of underlying intrinsic values, or had been compromised in some way by virtue of declines in our estimates of their underlying intrinsic values and future growth prospects. In other instances, we trimmed back positions in many of our clients' portfolios to make room for new additions or to generate losses, which could be used to offset realized gains.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) CONSIDERATIONS

As you might be aware, during the last year, there was a lot of back and forth in the press regarding the efficacy of incorporating environmental, social, and governance issues (ESG) into the investment processes of investment organizations. Numerous media contributors, industry regulators and government officials questioned whether incorporating these considerations is in conflict with an advisor's fiduciary responsibility to try to produce the best returns for their clients. Part of this, no doubt, had to do with the recent outperformance of energy related stocks, and new empirical evidence that suggested so called ESG portfolios (which often exclude investment in energy related businesses) were not producing the kinds of returns previously promised.

In light of these concerns, we want our clients to have a very clear understanding of how we think about incorporating ESG considerations into our investment process. As a reminder, we are not on some kind of moral crusade to "save the world" at Tweedy, Browne, although we do believe that behaving reasonably and responsibly when it comes to a number of these issues, particularly those associated with governance, may help to enhance corporate share value over time. We remain fully aware of our fiduciary responsibility and conduct ourselves accordingly. We are simply trying to produce the best possible risk adjusted returns for our clients, given their investment strategies, and to the extent ESG issues that we identify present material risks or opportunities related to our estimate of the future compound of the underlying intrinsic values of our portfolio holdings, they are evaluated and weighed in our decision-making process. Our approach has always been, and will continue to be, completely aligned with our fiduciary obligation.

With that backdrop, there were a few instances during the reporting period where an ESG issue became actionable in our investment process that we believe are worth mentioning here:

From a corporate governance perspective (the "G" in ESG), during the year we continued to be active in Industrias Bachoco, the Mexican chicken company, arguing aggressively against a proposed voluntary tender offer under consideration by an entity controlled by the Robinson Bours family. We believed that the offer made by the controlling family was well below fair value and unfairly benefitted the family at the expense of minority shareholders. Together with other shareholders, collectively representing about 16%

of the outstanding shares, we sent multiple letters to the company and the regulator to make our objections known. We believed the offer left shareholders with two bad options: be forced to embrace a low-ball offer and tender shares well below our estimate of their fair value; or not tender, and face even less liquidity in an already thinly-traded stock. As a result, we made numerous efforts to put pressure on the controlling family through the press and combined efforts with other shareholders in hopes of achieving a better outcome. Unfortunately, those efforts fell on deaf ears. The Mexican regulator approved the voluntary tender offer price, and the controlling shareholder moved forward and commenced its offer. We reluctantly made the decision to tender the shares rather than take the risk of being left with an illiquid security.

In the late summer of last year, we decided to sell our clients' remaining holdings in 3M, primarily due to recent litigation around product safety. There has been an extended running liability issue involving so-called "forever chemicals" getting into the public water supply, and a more recent issue involving earplugs made for the military. Damage awards in several early ear plug cases have been extraordinarily large and could be a drag on growth for 3M in the years ahead. While the stock remained reasonably priced, we felt it was more prudent to deploy the capital elsewhere rather than trying to wait out years of legal wrangling.

We also voted against a proposal by SCOR, the French reinsurance company holding, to change the by-laws to allow the chairman, Denis Kessler, to stay in place until age 72 (from 70). We felt that his performance, specifically regarding his handling of the attempted takeover by Covea, and the fumbled SCOR CEO transition, did not provide the good corporate governance that we had become accustomed to in SCOR in past years. Given that this measure required a super-majority to pass, we felt it was the best opportunity we had to try to force his retirement from the Board. The vote passed, and Mr. Kessler will remain chairman for two more years, after which he is expected to retire. SCOR's stock price remains extraordinarily cheap in our view, more than compensating for Kessler's continued service, which over the longer term has been quite satisfactory.

Last year, Tweedy, Browne signed on to a collaborative effort, led by the Rathbones stewardship team and coordinated through the PRI Collaboration Platform, to engage with FTSE 350 companies that were not in compliance with Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act of 2015. This issue of modern slavery in corporations and their supply chains is more pervasive than one might expect, and was important to us. This effort, which was entitled Votes Against Slavery, included 29 other investment managers and institutional investors, and this year identified and engaged with 44 companies that were not in compliance with the law. We are pleased to report that, as of October 3, all 44 companies were in compliance, and Votes Against Slavery won PRI's Stewardship Project of the Year. We were happy to have added our name in support of this important initiative.

COMINGS AND GOINGS

We are pleased to report that Andrew Ewert, a six-year veteran of our analytical team and equity stakeholder in our firm, was promoted to Managing Director and joined our Investment Committee effective July 1, 2022. Andrew joined Tweedy, Browne in 2016 after having worked at other value investing firms such as Equinox Partners and Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb. He received a Bachelor's degree in Business Administration from Emory University in 2000 and an MBA from Columbia University in 2007, where he completed Columbia's highly respected value investing program. During his tenure at Tweedy, Browne, Andrew has been an extraordinarily productive analyst, researching both domestic and international equities. In addition, he has been responsible for a host of successful investments that have made their way into our portfolios in recent years. He is a clear thinker, of impeccable character, and day-in and day-out has exhibited the requisite temperament necessary for success as a value investor.

Andrew replaced Sean McDonald, who resigned from the firm effective June 30. Sean had been a member of our investment team since 2009, as well as a respected friend and colleague, and we were sad to see him go. We wish him success in his future endeavors.

We remain particularly proud of the strength and stability of our investment team, which consists of the seven members of our Investment Committee, Will Browne as senior advisor thereto, and three additional security analysts. This eleven-person team has logged 280 years at Tweedy, Browne (ranging from 6 to 48 years) for an average tenure of 25 years. Moreover, in Tweedy, Browne's more than 100-year history, no member of the Management Committee of Tweedy, Browne has ever left to take another job elsewhere. We look forward to many more years of collaboration with this talented team of investment professionals.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The well intentioned experiment with extreme, and what some consider to be radical, monetary policy since the financial crisis of 2008 has been accompanied of late by unintended consequences, i.e., spiking inflation and interest rates and wide disparities in wealth and income that in our humble view threaten the sustainability of our long economic expansion. Some have argued that this has also led to a fragility in our capital markets and political institutions. As Richard Fisher, the former President of the Dallas Fed, recently said in an interview with Joe Kernan on CNBC's Squawk Box:

> *We have an inflationary problem. We are the lead central bank in the world. We have to demonstrate that we will deal with the problem even if we created that problem in the first place……Enormous excess was created by keeping rates at zero bound for too long and by not reining in the balance sheet, and we are seeing the reverse of the benefits that did for investors and companies. If you take this away, you are going to have strains in the system……We are just going to have to see what price is paid for again having started this process. Ben Bernanke, by the way, started the process of using the balance sheet and hugging the zero bound, and now it's gone to such an extreme it has to be brought back in and that will be painful.*

While the "zero bound" global economy of the last decade-plus favored passive investment over active investment, growth and technology stocks over value stocks, and US equities over non-US equities, the reverse would appear to be the case today. An inflationary environment where interest rates ultimately normalize higher, in our view, is likely to favor active investment over passive investment, value stocks over growth and technology stocks, and non-US equities over US equities.

That said, the near-term investment environment remains extremely challenging as markets come to grips with rising inflation and interest rates and the prospects for what could be a painful global recession. While valuations have corrected somewhat, with many stocks down more than 25% from their highs, it remains to be seen whether it is enough, in light of the prospect for earnings disappointments on the near term horizon. Nevertheless, we believe that this is an excellent time to be "mining for value," particularly in non-US equity markets, which to a significant degree, did not achieve the excesses in valuation experienced by their US counterparts. Accordingly, we continue to focus on companies that we believe have strong balance sheets and/or the ability to continue to deliver pricing power, and those where there has been recent insider buying in their shares by "knowledgeable insiders." Rest assured that we will keep our nose to the grindstone, researching new and existing investments on a stock-by-stock basis, and refreshing our client portfolios for what we believe could be a period of relative prosperity for our style of investing.

Thank you for investing with us and for your continued confidence. We work hard to earn and keep your trust, and we believe it is critical to our mutual success.

Sincerely,

Roger R. de Bree, Andrew Ewert, Frank H. Hawrylak, Jay Hill,
Thomas H. Shrager, John D. Spears, Robert Q. Wyckoff, Jr.
Investment Committee

PERFORMANCE | TWEEDY, BROWNE EQUITY COMPOSITES (NET OF FEES)*

	CUMULATIVE SINCE THE "GREAT ROTATION" (09/30/2020)	ANNUALIZED RETURNS FOR PERIODS ENDING 12/31/2022					GROWTH OF $1 MILLION SINCE INCEPTION
		1 YEAR	3 YEARS	5 YEARS	10 YEARS	SINCE INCEPTION	
US EQUITY/ADR COMPOSITE[1] » INCEPTION: DEC 31, 1990							32 YEARS
TB Composite	23.61%	-9.83%	1.75%	2.71%	5.92%	8.98%	$15.7
S&P 500/MSCI World Index(in USD)[7]	13.64	-18.14	4.94	6.14	8.85	8.93	$15.4
INTERNATIONAL EQUITY COMPOSITE *(CURRENCY EXPOSURE HEDGED TO THE USD)*[2] » INCEPTION: SEP 30, 1992							30¼ YEARS
TB Composite	22.22%	-7.47%	1.86%	2.49%	5.16%	8.86%	$13.0
MSCI EAFE (Hedged to USD)[7]	27.45	-4.60	5.31	5.79	8.73	6.72	$7.1
INTERNATIONAL EQUITY COMPOSITE *(IN USD)*[3] » INCEPTION: JUN 30, 1995							27½ YEARS
TB Composite	19.86%	-8.57%	0.31%	0.99%	3.33%	7.59%	$7.5
MSCI EAFE (in USD)[7]	10.46	-14.45	0.87	1.54	4.67	4.67	$3.5
GLOBAL EQUITY COMPOSITE *(CURRENCY EXPOSURE HEDGED TO THE USD)*[4] » INCEPTION: DEC 31, 1993							29 YEARS
TB Composite	23.87%	-7.00%	1.23%	2.45%	5.45%	7.67%	$8.5
MSCI World (Hedged to USD)[7]	18.45	-15.38	6.35	7.61	10.48	7.51	$8.2
GLOBAL EQUITY COMPOSITE *(IN USD)*[5] » INCEPTION: JUN 30, 1995							27½ YEARS
TB Composite	23.23%	-8.17%	1.46%	2.13%	4.57%	7.69%	$7.7
MSCI World (in USD)[7]	13.64	-18.14	4.94	6.14	8.85	6.92	$6.3
GLOBAL HIGH DIVIDEND YIELD EQUITY COMPOSITE[6] » INCEPTION: JUN 30, 1979							43½ YEARS
TB Composite	15.02%	-10.04%	-1.43%	1.32%	3.91%	11.21%	$101.6
S&P 500 (06/30/79–12/31/02)/ MSCI World (in USD) (01/01/03-present)[7]	13.64	-18.14	4.94	6.14	8.85	10.81	$87.0

* Please bear in mind that the performance results for individual client accounts may differ markedly from the Composite results included herein due to a number of factors, including when the account was opened, differences in holdings, and additions and/or withdrawals, among other factors. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

SEE IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE.

The performance results reflected on the previous page are over the course of many years and reflect multiple market cycles and varying geopolitical, market and economic conditions. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investing involves the risk of loss, including the loss of principal.

1. Disclosure regarding US Equity/ADR Composite: Results of individual portfolios will vary from results shown. US Equity/ADR portfolios invest primarily in US equity securities and, since 01/01/2005, also invest in ADRs, which are traded in the US financial markets but represent shares of non-US companies. The Composite consists of the results of the Firm's discretionary US Equity/ADR portfolios denominated in US dollars with assets in excess of $250,000 that have been under management for at least six months prior to measurement. This Composite excludes accounts that paid performance fees. If those accounts had been included, performance results would not have been materially lower than those shown. Results shown are asset-weighted using beginning of quarter values. As of 12/31/2022, 177 portfolios were included in the Composite, representing $281.8mm in assets under management. Net of fees results reflect (i) the deduction of actual investment advisory fees billed, (ii) the impact of transaction costs that are imposed in connection with the purchase or sale of a portfolio position such as brokerage commissions, exchange fees, local market fees, regulatory fees, if any. For periods prior to 10/01/2014, ticket charges imposed by Tweedy, Browne's clearing brokers were also included (since 10/01/2014, Tweedy, Browne no longer uses a clearing broker); performance for periods since 10/01/2014 reflects the impact of any ticket charges imposed by Pershing LLC (in the case of portfolios custodied at Pershing LLC (together, "Ticket Charges"). Composite results are inclusive of dividends and net of any applicable foreign withholding taxes. Investment advisory fees differ across portfolios.

2. Disclosure regarding International Equity Composite (Currency Exposure Hedged to the USD): Results of individual portfolios will vary from results shown. The Composite consists of the results of all fully discretionary international equity portfolios denominated in US dollars that have been under management for at least one quarter prior to measurement and that implement a currency hedging strategy. The portfolios included in the Composite invest primarily in securities of companies located outside, or that derive a large portion of their revenues from activities outside the United State, and hedged perceived foreign currency exposure, where practicable, back to the US dollar. Returns are time- and asset-weighted, and reflect beginning of quarter market values. Beginning 01/01/1998 and ending 10/03/2003, one international equity portfolio (with average quarterly AUM of $12.9mm) was excluded from the Composite due to highly volatile weekly cash flows, which impaired performance measurement. One portfolio in the Composite, the Tweedy, Browne International Value Fund, accounts for approximately 94.00% of Composite assets as of 12/31/2022. As of 12/31/2022, 5 portfolios were included in the Composite, representing $5,971mm in assets under management. Net of fees results reflect: (i) the deduction of the actual investment advisory fees billed, and in the case of a mutual fund portfolio and a private fund portfolio managed by Tweedy, Browne that are included in the Composite, and an offshore fund portfolio that was included in the Composite from 09/30/1992 through 03/31/2004, also reflect the deduction of all other expenses paid by those portfolios, and (ii) the impact of transaction costs that are imposed in connection with the purchase or sale of a portfolio position such as brokerage commissions, exchange fees, local market fees, and regulatory fees, if any, Ticket Charges as defined in footnote 1 above, and hedging costs. One portfolio in the Composite was charged a 20% annual incentive fee, accrued monthly. Net of fees results reflect this fee. This portfolio was included in the Composite from 09/30/1992 through 03/31/2004, the last full period during which the portfolio was denominated in USD. Composite results are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes. Investment advisory fees differ across portfolios.

3. Disclosure regarding International Equity Composite (in USD): Results of individual portfolios will vary from results shown. The Composite consist of the results of all fully discretionary international equity portfolios denominated in US dollars that have been under management for at least one quarter prior to measurement and that do not implement a currency hedging strategy. The portfolios included in the Composite invest primarily in securities of companies located outside, or that derive a large portion of their revenues from activities outside the United States. The Composite included just one account from inception through 12/31/2000. As of 12/31/2022, 5 accounts were included in the Composite, representing $561mm in assets under management. Net of fees results reflect (i) the deduction of actual investment advisory fees billed and, in the case of a mutual fund portfolio managed by Tweedy, Browne that is included in the Composite, also reflect the deduction of all other expenses paid by that portfolio, (ii) the impact of transaction costs that are imposed in connection with the purchase or sale of a portfolio position such as brokerage commissions, exchange fees, local market fees, and regulatory fees, if any, and Ticket Charges as described in footnote 1 above. Composite results are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes. Investment advisory fees differ across portfolios.

4. Disclosure regarding Global Equity Composite (Currency Hedged to the USD): Results of individual portfolios will vary from results shown. The Composite consist of the results of all fully discretionary, global equity portfolios denominated in US dollars that have been under management for at least one quarter prior to measurement and that implement a hedging strategy. The portfolios included in the Composite invest primarily in equity securities of companies located throughout the world and hedge perceived foreign currency exposure, where practicable, back to the US dollar. Returns are time and asset-weighted and reflect beginning of quarter market values. The Composite included just one portfolio from inception (12/31/1993) through 12/31/1997. As of 12/31/2022, 3 accounts were included in the Composite, representing $88mm in assets under management. Net of fees results reflect (i) the deduction of actual investment advisory fees billed and, in the case of a private fund portfolio managed by Tweedy, Browne that was included in the Composite during the period 12/31/1993 through 12/31/2009, also reflect the deduction of all other expenses paid by that portfolio, and (ii) the impact of transaction costs that are imposed in connection with the purchase or sale of a portfolio position such as brokerage commissions, exchange fees, local market fees, and regulatory fees, if any, Ticket Charges as described in footnote 1 above, and hedging costs . One portfolio in the Composite was charged a 20% annual incentive fee, accrued monthly. Net of actual fees results reflect this fee. This portfolio was included in the Composite from 12/31/1993 through 12/31/2009, at which time the portfolio changed to an unhedged strategy. Investment advisory fees differ across portfolios. Composite results are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes.

5. Disclosure regarding Global Equity Composite (In USD): Results of individual portfolios will vary from results shown. The Composite consists of the results of all fully discretionary, global equity portfolios denominated in US dollars that have been under management for at least one quarter prior to measurement and that that do not implement a currency hedging strategy. The portfolios included in the Composite invest primarily in equity securities of companies located throughout the world. Returns are time and asset-weighted and reflect beginning of quarter market values. The Composite included just one portfolio from inception (06/30/1995) through 12/31/1997. As of 12/31/2022, 8 portfolios were included in the Composite, representing $387mm in assets under management. Net of fees results reflects (i) the deduction of actual investment advisory fees billed,

and in the case of a private fund portfolio managed by Tweedy, Browne that was included in the Composite during the period 01/01/2010 through 06/30/2016, also reflect the deduction of all other expenses paid by that portfolio, and (ii) the impact of transaction costs that are imposed in connection with the purchase or sale of a portfolio position such as brokerage commissions, exchange fees, local market fees, and regulatory fees, if any, and Ticket Charges as described in footnote 1 above. The private fund portfolio was charge a 20% annual incentive fee accrued monthly. Net of fee results reflect the deduction of this incentive fee. Investment advisory fees differ across portfolios. Composite results are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes.

6. Disclosure regarding Global High Dividend Yield Equity Composite: Results of individual portfolios will vary from results shown. The Composite consists of the results of all fully discretionary, global high dividend yield portfolios denominated in US dollars that have been under management for at least one quarter prior to measurement. From 07/01/1979 through 07/31/1997, the portfolios in the Composite consisted primarily of US equity securities that paid dividends. Since August 1997, non-US securities were added to the portfolios, and since January 2003, the portfolios have had meaningful exposure to non-US equities and reflect a global high dividend yield mandate. From time to time through 12/31/1994, fixed income securities comprised a modest allocation of Composite assets. Composite results are based on time-weighted portfolio returns, are asset-weighted and are calculated monthly. As of 12/31/2022, 9 accounts were included in the Composite, representing $103 million in assets under management. Composite results are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes.

Net of fees results reflect (i) the deduction of actual investment advisory fees billed, (ii) the impact of transaction costs that are imposed in connection with the purchase or sale of a portfolio position such as brokerage commissions, exchange fees, local market fees, regulatory fees, if any, Ticket Charges as described in footnote 1 above, and, in the case of a mutual fund and a private fund portfolio managed by Tweedy, Browne that are included in the Composite, also reflect the deduction of all other expenses paid by those portfolios. Up until 1991, the Composite consisted of a single portfolio that did not pay TBC an investment advisory fee. This explains why the gross and net of actual fee result for the Composite are the same until 1992. Agree, not needed if gross results are shown nowhere in client letter. Since 1992 through 05/31/2022, the last full period during which the portfolio was under Tweedy Browne's management and included in the Composite, the percentage of the Composite assets represented by the non-fee-paying portfolio was as follows: 1992: 22.6%, 1993: 21.0%, 1994: 20.7%, 1995: 21.7%, 1996: 22.8%, 1997: 25.2%, 1998: 27.0%, 1999: 25.8%, 2000: 26.3%, 2001: 23.5%, 2002: 21.4%, 2003: 20.4%, 2004: 18.9%, 2005: 19.3%, 2006: 5.9%, 2007: 1.5%, 2008: 1.1%, 2009: 1.0%, 2010: 0.6%, 2011: 0.3%, 2012: 0.1%, 2013: 0.1%, 2014: 0.1%, 2015: 0.3%, 2016: 0.5%; 2017: 0.6%, 2018: 1.0%, 2019: 1.1%, 2020: 1.5%, 2021: 1.8%, 1.9% (as of 05/31/2022).

7. Disclosure Regarding the Indexes: *The hedged indexes are included to illustrate how the stocks that are the components of an index would have performed in their local currencies for a US dollar investor. The portfolios included in the composites are actively managed, unlike the indices, and consist of securities that vary widely from those included in the indices in terms of portfolio composition, country and sector allocations, and other metrics. The hedged indexes are fully nominally hedged on a monthly basis, whereas Tweedy, Browne's hedged portfolios only hedge their perceived currency risk where practicable. Tweedy, Browne applies a different hedging methodology than the hedged indexes. Results for each index are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes. Index results are shown for illustrative purposes only, and do not reflect any deduction for fees and expenses. You cannot invest directly in an index.*

*The **MSCI EAFE Index** is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed markets, excluding the US and Canada. The **MSCI EAFE Index (Hedged to USD)** consists of the results of the MSCI EAFE Index hedged 100% back into US dollars and accounts for interest rate differentials in forward currency exchange rates. The **MSCI EAFE Index (USD)** reflects the return of the MSCI EAFE Index for a US dollar investor.*

*The **MSCI World Index** is an unmanaged, free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed markets. The **MSCI World Index (Hedged to USD)** consists of the results of the MSCI World Index with its foreign currency exposure hedged 100% back into US dollars. The index accounts for interest rate differentials in forward currency exchange rates. The **MSCI World Index (in USD)** reflects the return of the MSCI World Index for a US dollar investor. Index results are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes. Index figures do not reflect any deduction for fees, expenses or taxes.*

For Global High Dividend Equity Composite: *The **S&P 500/MSCI World Index (USD)** is a combination of the S&P 500 Index and the MSCI World Index, linked together by TBC, and represents the performance of the S&P 500 Index for periods 06/30/1979 through 12/31/2002 and the performance of the MSCI World Index (USD) for the period beginning 01/01/2003 and thereafter. From inception through 2002, the portfolios included in the Global High Dividend Equity Composite consisted primarily of US equity securities, so the S&P 500 was chosen as the relevant benchmark. Beginning January 2003, the portfolios had meaningful exposure to non-US equities, and reflected a global mandate, so the MSCI World Index (USD) was chosen as the relevant benchmark. The **S&P 500** is an unmanaged, capitalization-weighted index that assumes the reinvestment of dividends, and is generally considered representative of US large capitalization stocks.*

For US Equity / ADR Composite: *The **S&P 500/MSCI World Index (in USD)** is a combination of the S&P 500 Index and the MSCI World Index (in USD) linked together by Tweedy, Browne, and represents the performance of the S&P 500 Index for the periods 12/31/1992 – 12/31/2004, and the performance of the MSCI World Index (in USD) beginning 01/01/2005 and thereafter. From inception through 12/31/2004, the portfolios included in the Composite invested primarily in US equity securities, and so the S&P 500 was chosen as the relevant benchmark. Beginning 01/01/2005, portfolios in the Composite began to have meaningful exposure to non-US equities, generally through investments in ADRs, so the MSCI World Index (in USD) has been chosen as the relevant benchmark.*

Benchmark information is provided for comparison purposes only. Portfolios are actively managed and are expected to look very different from the benchmark, in terms of both portfolio composition and returns.

ROLLING RETURNS

As we have written in past letters, equity return streams are lumpy by their nature, and perhaps nothing illustrates that better than an examination of rolling returns. The following scatterplot charts track the rolling five-year average annual returns for our international hedged composite and global unhedged composites compared to the rolling five-year results for their relevant benchmark indexes. The charts reveal a recurring pattern in each composite's 20-plus-year, index-beating cumulative return stream since inception: the composites have consistently bested their benchmarks in almost all difficult and challenging stock market environments. In our view, it is the resiliency in the face of adversity that has allowed the bulk of our investors to remain committed during those times when equity markets are uncooperative. The ability to "stay on the bus" during those bumpy periods has perhaps been the most important factor in long-term wealth building.

INTERNATIONAL EQUITY COMPOSITE *(CURRENCY EXPOSURE HEDGED TO THE USD)*
5-Year Rolling Average Annual Returns (calculated quarterly | net)
September 30, 1992 through December 31, 2022

Out of 101 five-year measurement periods, the International Equity Composite (Hedged) has outperformed the MSCI EAFE Index (Hedged to USD) 65 times, or 64% of measured periods.



	COMPOSITE	INDEX
Down Market (Below 0%) – 21 periods Composite beats Index in 95% of periods	3.90%	-3.55%
Normal Market (0-10%) – 46 periods Composite beats Index in 54% of periods	6.68%	5.52%
Robust Market (Above 10%) – 34 periods Composite beats Index in 59% of periods	14.17%	13.32%

The above chart illustrates the five-year rolling average annual returns, net, (calculated quarterly) for the Composite since September 30, 1992 compared to the five-year average-annual rolling returns for its benchmark index. The horizontal axis represents the returns for the index while the vertical axis represents the returns for the Composite. The diagonal axis is a line of demarcation separating periods of outperformance from periods of underperformance. Plot points above the diagonal axis are indicative of the Composite's relative outperformance, while points below the diagonal axis are indicative of relative Composite underperformance. Returns were plotted for three distinct equity market environments: a "down market" (benchmark return was less than 0%); a "normal market" (benchmark return was between 0% and 10%); and a "robust market" (benchmark return was greater than 10%). There were 101 rolling return periods between September 30, 1992 and December 31, 2022. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

SEE PAGES 15-16 FOR THE COMPOSITE'S PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES.

GLOBAL EQUITY COMPOSITE *(IN USD)*

5-Year Rolling Average Annual Returns (calculated monthly | net)

June 30, 1995 through December 31, 2022

Out of 271 five-year measurement periods, the Global Equity Composite (in USD) has outperformed the MSCI World Index (USD) 148 times, or 55% of measured periods.



	COMPOSITE	INDEX
Down Market (Below 0%) – 58 periods Composite beats Index in 97% of periods	4.79%	-2.02%
Normal Market (0-10%) – 127 periods Composite beats Index in 45% of periods	5.46%	5.30%
Robust Market (Above 10%) – 86 periods Composite beats Index in 41% of periods	11.44%	13.17%

The above chart illustrates the five-year rolling average annual returns, net, (calculated monthly) for the Composite since June 30, 1995 compared to the five-year average annual rolling returns for its benchmark index. The horizontal axis represents the returns for the index while the vertical axis represents the returns for the Composite. The diagonal axis is a line of demarcation separating periods of outperformance from periods of underperformance. Plot points above the diagonal axis are indicative of the Composite's relative outperformance, while points below the diagonal axis are indicative of relative Composite underperformance. Returns were plotted for three distinct equity market environments: a "down market" (benchmark return was less than 0%); a "normal market" (benchmark return was between 0% and 10%); and a "robust market" (benchmark return was greater than 10%). There were 271 rolling return periods between June 30, 1995 and December 31, 2022. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

SEE PAGES 15-16 FOR THE COMPOSITE'S PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES.

GLOBAL HIGH DIVIDEND YIELD EQUITY COMPOSITE *(IN USD)*

5-Year Rolling Average Annual Returns (calculated monthly | net)

June 30, 1979 through December 31, 2022

Out of 463 five-year measurement periods, the Global High Dividend Yield Equity Composite (in USD) has outperformed the S&P Index/MSCI World Index (USD)* 208 times, or 45% of measured periods.



	COMPOSITE	INDEX*
Down Market (Below 0%) – 49 periods Composite beats Index in 100% of periods	5.74%	-1.61%
Normal Market (0-10%) – 137 periods Composite beats Index in 59% of periods	5.91%	5.39%
Robust Market (Above 10%) – 277 periods Composite beats Index in 30% of periods	15.36%	16.29%

The above chart illustrates the five-year average annual rolling returns, net, (calculated monthly) for the Composite since June 30, 1979 compared to the five-year average annual rolling returns forits benchmark index. The horizontal axis represents the returns for the index, while the vertical axis represents the returns for the Composite. The diagonal axis is a line of demarcation separating periods of outperformance from periods of underperformance. Plot points above the diagonal axis are indicative of the Composite's relative outperformance, while points below the diagonal axis are indicative of the Composite's relative underperformance. Returns were plotted for three distinct equity market environments: a 'down market' (benchmark return was less than 0%); a 'normal market' (benchmark return was between 0% and 10%); and a 'robust market' (benchmark return was greater than 10%). There were 463 average annual rolling return periods between June 30, 1979 and December 31, 2022. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

* The S&P 500/MSCI World Index (USD) is a combination of the S&P 500 Index and the MSCI World Index, linked together by TBC, and represents the performance of the S&P 500 Index for periods 06/30/1979 through 12/31/2002 and the performance of the MSCI World Index (USD) for the period beginning 01/01/2003 and thereafter. From inception through 2002, the portfolios included in the Global High Dividend Equity Composite consisted primarily of US equity securities, so the S&P 500 was chosen as the relevant benchmark. Beginning January 2003, the portfolios had meaningful exposure to non-US equities, and reflected a global mandate, so the MSCI World Index (USD) was chosen as the relevant benchmark. The S&P 500 is an unmanaged, capitalization-weighted index that assumes the reinvestment of dividends, and is generally considered representative of US large capitalization stocks.

SEE PAGES 15-16 FOR THE COMPOSITE'S PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES.

NOTES

S&P Style Indices divide the complete market capitalization of each parent index into growth and value segments. Constituents are drawn from the S&P 500. The S&P 500 Value Index measures value stocks using three factors: the ratios of book value, earnings, and sales to price. The S&P 500 Growth Index measures growth stocks using three factors: the ratios of book value, earnings, and sales to price. The MSCI style methodology adopts a two-dimensional framework for value/growth segmentation: each security is given an overall style characteristic derived from its value and growth scores and is then placed into either a value or a growth index (or is partially allocated to both). The value investment style characteristics for index construction are defined using three variables: book value to price, 12-month forward earnings to price and dividend yield. The growth investment style characteristics for index construction are defined using five variables: long-term forward EPS growth rate, short-term forward EPS growth rate, current internal growth rate and long-term historical EPS growth trend and long-term historical sales per share growth trend. The MSCI EAFE Value Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across developed markets countries around the world, excluding the US and Canada. The MSCI ACWI ex USA Value Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across 22 developed and 24 emerging markets countries. The MSCI Europe Value Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across the 15 developed markets countries in Europe. The MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Value Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across 2 of 3 developed markets countries (excluding Japan) and 8 emerging markets countries in Asia. The MSCI Emerging Markets Value Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across 24 Emerging Markets (EM) countries. The MSCI World Growth Index captures large and mid-cap securities exhibiting overall growth style characteristics across 23 developed markets. The MSCI EAFE Growth Index captures large and mid-cap securities exhibiting overall growth style characteristics across developed markets countries around the world, excluding the US and Canada.

Client accounts are actively managed, unlike the indexes, and consist of securities that vary widely from those included in the indexes in terms of portfolio composition, country and sector allocations, and other metrics. Hedged indexes are included to illustrate how the stocks that are components of the hedged indexes would have performed in their local currencies for a US dollar investor. The hedged indexes are fully nominally hedged on a monthly basis, whereas the hedged client accounts only hedge their perceived currency exposure where practicable. Tweedy, Browne applies a different hedging methodology than the hedged indexes. Index results are shown for illustrative purposes only.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Current and future portfolio holdings are subject to risk. The securities of small, less well-known companies may be more volatile than those of larger companies. In addition, investing in foreign securities involves additional risks beyond the risks of investing in securities of US markets. These risks which are more pronounced in emerging markets, include economic and political considerations not typically found in US markets, including currency fluctuation, political uncertainty and different financial standards, regulatory environments, and overall market and economic factors in the countries. Force majeure events such as pandemics and natural disasters are likely to increase the risks inherent in investments and could have a broad negative impact on the world economy and business activity in general. Value investing involves the risk that the market will not recognize a security's intrinsic value for a long time, or that a security thought to be undervalued may actually be appropriately priced when purchased. Dividends are not guaranteed, and a company currently paying dividends may cease paying dividends at any time. Diversification does not guarantee a profit or protect against a loss in declining markets.

Although the practice of hedging perceived foreign currency exposure, where practicable, reduces the risk of loss from exchange rate movements, it also reduces the ability of a hedged portfolio to gain from favorable exchange rate movements when the base currency declines against the currencies in which the portfolio's investments are denominated, and may impose costs on the portfolio. As a result of practical considerations, fluctuations in a security's prices, and fluctuations in currencies, an account's hedges are expected to approximate, but will generally not equal, the account's perceived currency exposure.

Stocks and bonds are subject to different risks. In general, stocks are subject to greater price fluctuations and volatility than bonds and can decline significantly in value in response to adverse issuer, political, regulatory, market, or economic developments. Unlike stocks, bonds, if held to maturity, generally offer to pay both a fixed rate of return and a fixed principal value. Bonds are subject to interest rate risk (as interest rates rise bond prices generally fall), the risk of issuer default, issuer credit risk, and inflation risk, although US Treasuries are backed by the full faith and credit of the US government.

This letter contains forthright opinions and statements on investment techniques, economics, market conditions and other matters. Of course, there is no guarantee that these opinions and statements will prove to be correct, since some of them are inherently speculative; as such, they should not be relied upon as statements of fact.

Positions held and opinions expressed herein are as of the date of this publication and are subject to change without notice. Securities referenced may not be held in all client accounts. Investment objectives, tax considerations and other factors may vary from account to account.

The Managing Directors and employees of Tweedy, Browne Company LLC may have a financial interest in the securities mentioned herein. They or their family members may own these securities in their own securities accounts (only where such ownership is consistent with the Firm's Code of Ethics), or through their ownership of various pooled vehicles that own these securities.

DEFINITIONS

Price/Earnings (or P/E) ratio is a comparison of the company's closing stock price and its trailing 12-month earnings per share.

Price/Book Value (or P/BV) is the ratio of the market value of a company's shares to the value of the company's assets as expressed on its balance sheet.

P/E Forward is calculated by dividing the price on calculation date (i.e., September 30, 2022) by the 12-month forward EPS estimate derived on a rolling basis from the consensus of analysts' earnings estimates for the next fiscal year.

Return On Equity (or ROE) is a measure of financial performance calculated by dividing net income by shareholders' equity.

Enterprise Value (or EV) is a measure of a company's total value (market value of common stock + market value of preferred equity + market value of debt + minority interest – cash and investments).

Earnings Before Interest and Tax (or EBIT) is an indicator of a company's profitability, calculated as revenue minus expenses, excluding tax and interest

Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and Amortization (or EBITA) is used to gauge a company's operating profitability (earnings before tax + interest expense + amortization expense).

Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (or EBITDA) is used to gauge a company's operating profitability, adding back the non-cash expenses of depreciation and amortization to a firm's operating income (EBIT + depreciation + amortization expense).